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Abstract 
 
Economists seldom make explicit use of functional explanation, although they 
sometimes use it implicitly.  Functional theorising has lost favour among social 
scientists in recent years, and few are now willing to adopt functional language.  
This paper argues that, despite some drawbacks, explicit functional methods have 
several attractive features, including a pluralistic attitude to causality, an 
awareness of stratification and emergence, and a compatibility with a realist 
perspective.  Functional methods on their own cannot provide full causal 
explanations, but they can raise important theoretical issues often neglected in 
mainstream economics. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
When trying to understand economic and social institutions, one is always tempted to seek 
their functions.  They should, it seems, fulfil an identifiable function, otherwise they would 
have withered away or never appeared in the first place.  Functional explanation is the formal 
variant of this type of reasoning.  Social scientists who adopt functional methods hope to 
discover the functions of social behaviour and thereby explain why the behaviour emerged 
and why it persists. 
 
    Explicit use of functional methods has been far rarer among economists than among other 
social scientists.  Economists have generally mistrusted such methods, though the grounds for 
their mistrust often remain unstated.  Much of the antipathy has derived from the tensions 
between economics and sociology, where functional arguments have usually started from a 
top-down, holistic perspective that jars with the bottom-up individualism of neoclassical 
economics.  Even among sociologists, however, functionalism has become unfashionable: 
since the late 1960s the balance has swung towards smaller scale, more individualistic and 
interpretative approaches.  Throughout the social sciences, recent trends have veered away 
from functional methods, which are in danger of being eclipsed altogether.  The word 
'functionalist' now has pejorative overtones, so that few academics are willing to risk being 
labelled in this way. 
 
    Despite the antifunctionalist climate, many economists still resort to tacit functional 
arguments.  Consider, for example, the fundamental theorems of welfare economics at the 
heart of the neoclassical case for a market economy.  Perfectly competitive markets are 
portrayed as having desirable consequences; they fulfil the function of generating 
Pareto-efficient outcomes.  Viewed cautiously, this might be interpreted as a hypothetical 
benchmark, of limited practical relevance.  But many economists have gone further and 
invoked the desirable efficiency properties of markets to explain their superiority over 
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alternative economic systems.  Much economic commentary skirts close to functional logic, 
although it hardly ever refers to functions or functionalism. 
 
    Functional methods are more overt in heterodox economic theory, notably institutional 
economics.  The 'new institutionalism' has explained economic arrangements by indicating 
their desirable efficiency properties, a classic example of functional logic.  Older forms of 
institutionalism have put forward theories with an affinity to structural-functionalist 
sociology.  Marxian authors, ostensibly critics of functionalism, have explained economic 
institutions through their beneficial consequences for the ruling classes.  Wherever one looks 
in both orthodox and heterodox economics, one can find tacit functional arguments. 
 
    This sits uneasily with the current distaste for functional explanation.  If it is truly 
worthless and discredited, then why does it keep reappearing?  Why do its critics have trouble 
expunging it from their own theories?  Its persistence prompts one to wonder (in an 
appropriate vein) whether it may indeed be fulfilling useful functions. 
 
    The present paper makes a qualified defence of functional explanation, arguing that, despite 
some drawbacks, it still has value.  On its own it cannot provide complete accounts of 
economic and social behaviour because it lacks the necessary depth, and to this extent the 
term 'functional explanation' may be a misnomer.  But identifying functions can be a key 
element of explanatory theory without offering a full explanation.  Functional reasoning has 
virtues as well as vices, and to reject it outright would be an overreaction.  The next two 
sections of the paper consider the nature of functional explanation and the case against it.  The 
paper then examines functional arguments in economics and the case for greater tolerance of 
functional methods. 
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2.  The nature of functional explanation  
 
There is no consensus on what constitutes functional explanation or how it relates to other 
types of explanation in the social sciences.  Ambiguities surround both the meaning of 
functional and the character of the explanation being sought.  In the absence of a universal 
definition, it is not uncommon for an explanation to be classified as functional by some 
authors but non-functional by others.  The risk of inconsistency is clear and, before 
proceeding, one should consider the nature of functional explanation and the interpretation to 
be adopted in the present paper. 
 
    The nearest thing to a standard definition of functional explanation emerged from the 
debates over functionalism in the 1950s and early 1960s (Hempel 1959; Nagel 1961, 
Chapter 16; Demerath and Peterson 1967).  According to this definition, a functional method 
will explain an economic or social institution by identifying the functions it performs within a 
broader systemic context.  Two features of this definition stand out.  First, a function is a 
process that can only occur over time and through a system containing the institution in 
question.  Functional explanation thus involves a systemic and intertemporal outlook.  
Second, the item being explained is the institution rather than the system within which it is 
located.  Although the consequences of the institution must be worked out within the system, 
they do not have to be distributed evenly among all parts of the system and could be 
concentrated on a subset of parts revolving around the institution being explained.  A 
functional explanation, while being systemic, need not depict institutions as promoting a 
greater good spread widely throughout the whole containing system. 
 
    Some authors have distinguished between functional explanation, as defined above, and 
functional analysis or functionalism (Cummins 1975).  Difficulties may arise with functional 
explanation because identifying the functions of an institution within a containing system 
does not guarantee the institution's necessity: the same function might be performed equally 
well by another, unobserved institution.  This weakens the bond between the institution and 
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the containing system, throwing doubt on whether the systemic approach can explain the 
institution.  A possible remedy, suggested by Cummins (1975), is to turn away from 
explaining institutions towards explaining the containing system.  Theorists would then start 
at the systemic level and ascribe functions to various parts of the system without claiming that 
function-ascription can explain why the parts exist.  The resulting functional analysis would 
fulfil an analytical rather than explanatory role by examining the parts of a given system and 
how they interact to make up the system.  Such a method would integrate institutions with 
their systemic context and, in doing so, present a more coherent picture of a total system. 
 
   Further problems in defining functional explanation derive from its relationship with causal 
explanation.  The functional/causal distinction dates back to the work of Durkheim in the late 
nineteenth century (Durkheim 1895, Chapter 5).  Functional explanations in social science 
concentrate on the surface phenomenon of how observable institutions function, without 
attempting to expose the deeper causality propelling social behaviour.  Theorising can be 
conducted at the higher, systemic and institutional levels.  Causal explanation, by contrast, 
searches explicitly for causal mechanisms and tries to penetrate beneath the institutional level 
to the level of the individual or, beyond that, to human biology.  Such a functional/causal 
distinction need not create a conflict and leaves open the possibility of functional explanations 
coexisting with causal ones.  In fact, defenders of functional methods are seldom outright 
opponents of causal explanation and usually eager to emphasise the compatibility of the two 
approaches. 
 
    Ambiguities may arise over whether or not functional explanation is linked with any 
particular causal processes.  For some authors, functional explanation need not specify the 
precise causality behind how and why an institution came into being (Davis 1959; 
Merton 1968).  Causal relations must presumably exist, but functional explanation can shed 
light on social behaviour without delving into a detailed analysis of causality.  Functional 
differs from causal explanation in that it allows slackness or indeterminacy in its causal 
relations and can accommodate more than one type of causality.  If the causality could be 
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pinned down, then functional would be transformed into causal explanation.  Until this 
happens (and it may never be feasible), functional explanation will be the best we can do.  
Adopting a functional approach can thus be construed as a way of seeking causal explanations 
rather than a self-contained method (Gellner 1973; Abrahamson 1978, Chapter 2).  Full causal 
explanation would be the ideal, but it is unlikely to be attainable in the near future and 
functional explanation presents a more realistic goal. 
 
    Other authors have regarded functional explanation as a subset of causal explanation.  
Three main types of causality have been associated with functional explanation: purposeful 
behaviour, natural selection and complex causality.  The first of these is rooted in the standard 
meaning of the word 'function', which implies a goal or purpose.  To be consistent with 
everyday usage, a functional explanation would have to be teleological, embodying a purpose, 
yet this raises some awkward issues.  If the teleology is subjective and traceable to human 
agents, then functional methods are yielding explanations that might be better classified as 
intentional.  Subjective teleology would threaten the distinctiveness of functional explanation 
and reduce it to being an offshoot of intentional causality.  If, on the other hand, the teleology 
is objective and cannot be traced to human agents, then functional arguments may be 
illegitimately ascribing purposefulness to inanimate objects.  Objective teleology seems to 
give institutions the power to think for themselves and pursue their own goals independently 
of human design.  Modern theorists, reluctant to appeal to objective teleologies, use the word 
'function' in a broader sense to denote merely good or useful consequences, without any 
explicit intention or purposefulness (Ryan 1970, Chapter 8).  But many writers in the past 
have been happy to invoke objective teleologies operating through natural orders, invisible 
hands and driving forces of history (key examples are Hegelian theories of history and natural 
law interpretations of the invisible hand in economics).  Whatever its difficulties, teleology 
can provide a causal underpinning for functional arguments. 
 
    If teleology is ruled out, an alternative is to base functional explanation on non-purposeful 
causal processes, in other words, natural selection.  Where an institution did not originate 
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from a master plan or guiding hand, it must seemingly have evolved as the spontaneous 
outcome of natural selection or the equivalent in the social sphere.  Some authors have limited 
functional explanation to one particular causal process ± natural selection ± and defined all 
other causal relations as being non-functional: Elster (1983, Chapter 2), for instance, sets 
functional explanation (based on natural selection) alongside causal explanation (based on 
causal laws) and intentional explanation (based on purposeful human behaviour).  This 
narrows the space available for functional explanations, since clear-cut cases of natural 
selection in human societies may be hard to discern.  The insistence that functional arguments 
must be founded on natural selection is commoner among their critics such as Elster than 
among their proponents.  Defining functional methods as evolutionary has the drawback of 
jarring with everyday usage of the word 'function', which implies a purpose.  Paradoxically, 
an explanation centred on intended and openly declared functions would be classified as 
non-functional according to this scheme. 
 
    A third causal interpretation of functional explanation associates it with its own, unique 
causality.  Stinchcombe (1968), for example, draws from biology by linking functional 
explanation with equifinality or homeostasis, that is, the tendency for a system to converge on 
a common end point, regardless of the starting point or intervening obstacles.  Such a 
tendency, which is empirically accessible, can be seen as providing evidence for a circular 
causal chain.  It may be impossible to go further than this, since the workings of the causal 
chain may be too complex for analysts to deal with satisfactorily.  In the circumstances, the 
theorist could describe functional explanation as positing a causal relation of a special, 
complex (if somewhat nebulous) kind.  A similar approach is suggested by Sober (1983), 
whose concept of equilibrium explanation focuses on observed tendencies to reach 
equilibrium, without trying to disentangle all the underlying causal processes.  The openness 
and indeterminacy of functional methods can thus be viewed as a special, irreducible form of 
causality instead of a promissory note for later, fuller causal explanations. 
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    Ambiguity over causal links broaches the related issue of whether functional explanations 
can include planning or whether functions must be unintended.  An ascribed function is 
compatible with at least three levels of knowledge.  The highest level assumes that some or all 
people know the function and create or maintain the institution so as to fulfil it.  Under these 
conditions the function is intended and follows from human design.  The broader versions of 
functional theory have been happy to embrace intended (manifest) functions alongside 
unintended (latent) ones (Merton 1968).  A lower level of knowledge is where people do not 
at first intend the function but recognise it at a later stage.  Valuable institutions may be 
retained by design, even when they were never planned, so that they arise from an 
evolutionary process supplemented with adaptive learning.  Functional methods can then 
include the gradual perception of desirable consequences ± a hybrid case falling between 
manifest and latent functions ± but exclude intended functions known from the outset 
(Van Parijs 1981).  The lowest level of knowledge is where people neither intend nor 
recognise the function of an institution, which evolves by natural selection without ex ante 
planning or ex post realisation of its value (Elster 1982, 1983).  The institution may have a 
perceived function but, if so, this cannot be its actual function, to which people remain blind. 
 
    The size of the social units in functional explanations has been variable.  Where the 
investigator aims to carry out a functional analysis of a total social system, the appropriate 
social unit will be the whole society, and institutions will be meeting societal needs.  The 
prime exponent of this was Talcott Parsons, whose structural-functionalism portrayed 
institutions as being parts of a larger, smoothly functioning system (Parsons 1937, 1951).  In 
his earlier work, Parsons wanted to keep away from holistic or individualistic outcomes, but 
his later work expanded into a grand systemic vision, holistic in practice if not in its declared 
goals.  Other functionalist writers have been careful to avoid applying functional explanation 
exclusively to whole societies.  Merton (1968) differs from Parsons in basing functional 
explanation on smaller, interacting social groups.  Arrangements beneficial to one social 
group may be detrimental to others, and so the fulfilment of social functions may not bring 
social order or harmony.  This can give richer social theory that escapes the monolithic, 
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overextended character of Parsonian structural-functionalism.  Generally speaking, there is 
little reason to impose prior limits on the social units to which functional explanation can be 
applied.  The units and balance among them can vary with the topics being investigated. 
 
    Although functional methods often have a holistic flavour, functionalism is logically 
distinct from holism.  It is quite possible to have individualistic brands of functionalism, in 
which there are no social groups and institutions are a functional response to individual needs.  
An early example of this occurred in social anthropology, where the individualistic 
functionalism of Malinowski was among the first functional theories in social science 
(Abrahamson 1978).  Later examples are the (often implicit) functional arguments in 
neoclassical economics and the new institutionalism, which identify the functions of 
institutions by tracing the consequences for individual preferences.  As these examples show, 
the systemic context of functional explanation can be expressed in bottom-up, individualistic 
terms.  The variable scale of functional methods, along with their hazy causal relations, 
ensures that they need not entail social holism.  What they normally do entail is some relation 
between a whole and its parts (a stratified theory), but the whole does not inevitably dominate 
the parts. 
 
    When dealing with functionalism, one should allow for the alternative definitions of 
functional explanation.  The following discussion will take a broad view and regard any 
theory that ascribes functions as being a functional method.  Such theories might not fit 
certain formal definitions of functional explanation, but they belong to a common family of 
functionally based approaches.  Consequently, both functional explanation and functional 
analysis will be counted as functional methods, and the precise causality behind functional 
reasoning will be left open.  The significant issue is whether or not the ascription of functions 
has any value in economic theory. 
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3.  Arguments against functional methods  
 
The heyday of functionalist social theory was the 1950s and early 1960s, when 
structural-functionalism held sway as the sociological mainstream, a status threatened only 
from the late 1960s onwards.  Challenges to functional methods in social science came from 
various sources and reflected diverse theoretical perspectives: classical and structuralist 
Marxism, New Left culturalism, phenomenological approaches, ethnomethodology, and so 
forth.  Among the numerous antifunctional arguments, several themes can be identified. 
 
    A common concern of critics has been the frequent resort to biological analogies in 
functionalist social theory.  The analogy drawn by Parsons was with living organisms whose 
internal organs function as parts of a system and permit the organisms to survive.  Any 
systemic failure would for an organism result in death and for a society result in the collapse 
of existing institutions.  It is unclear, however, that a society can experience sudden 
'institutional death'.  The analogy between an organism and a society does not seem especially 
close, since the most fundamental social changes are rarely if ever as sudden and terminal as 
the death of an organism.  One can thus ask whether a society's need to reproduce itself 
provides a satisfactory basis for functional explanation.  Can we explain institutions by saying 
that they have the function of reproducing themselves?  Functional arguments of this sort 
seem circular and vacuous.  Criticism of the organic analogy refers chiefly to Parsonian 
structural-functionalism, and other kinds of functionalism are less vulnerable.  The systemic 
aspect of functional methods is strongest when they take the form of functional analysis, 
treating all institutions as components of a total social system, as against the standard 
definition of functional explanation.  If the social units are groups, then the theory no longer 
requires a single set of needs for the whole society.  Institutions may have the function of 
preserving group interests, and institutional change may redistribute wealth or power without 
causing 'institutional death'.  When there are many social units, there can be many functions 
fulfilled by different, localised social arrangements.  Reproduction is always important, but it 
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does not have to be the only function invoked, and anything that might be regarded as a 
function could be the basis for functional explanation. 
 
    A related argument is that functionalist sociology has neglected human agency and 
replaced it with structured, normalised behaviour (Wrong 1961; Homans 1964).  Functional 
methods, the critics argue, concentrate on disembodied social systems and institutions, at the 
expense of human beings.  The result is that people tend to be portrayed as automatons 
following social norms that fulfil desirable social ends.  Individual and social interests are 
fused into a perfect social will, so that the account of human behaviour leaves no role for 
individual action other than conforming to socially determined norms.  The main critical 
attack has again been on Parsonian structural-functionalism.  There is an irony here, because 
downgrading human agency had no place in Parsons's initial desire to overcome the 
separation of agency and structure.  He saw his own social theory as blending the structural 
approach of Durkheim with the more individualistic approach of Weber (Parsons 1937); his 
non-reductive aims were similar to those of his later critics, such as Giddens (1977).  
Functionalist theory was often careful to incorporate several layers, including individuals and 
social structures, with each layer having emergent properties irreducible to the other layers.  
Individuals may be rooted in material nature and located within a social structure and yet have 
emergent powers not wholly explicable by natural or social factors.  A functional approach 
should, in principle, be able to avoid structural reductionism and properly appreciate 
individual agency.  Unfortunately, much of this early subtlety was lost in later 
structural-functionalist work, which leaned towards the structural side and constructed 
systemic models of ever-increasing size and complexity.  Criticisms of a structural bias do 
have some justification, but the bias is not an inevitable feature of functional methods. 
 
    Critics have berated functional theories for their failure to uncover the origins of 
institutions that fulfil social functions.  The problem arises chiefly with the narrower 
definitions of functionalism, where functions must be unintended and unrecognised.  
Institutions with desirable consequences must then evolve spontaneously from an 
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invisible-hand process, not from planning.  Functional arguments become vulnerable to 
criticism if they cannot connect desirable social outcomes to the behaviour of people 
oblivious of such outcomes.  Legitimate functional explanation, according to this argument, 
must have a feedback loop ensuring that unintended functions are fulfilled through individual 
behaviour.  Elster (1982) asserts that no feedback loop exists and that functional explanation 
must be rejected.  He debars intended functions and learning processes from functional 
methods, insisting that people must be unaware of the desirable social consequences of their 
actions: functional explanation can have as its feedback mechanism only natural selection free 
from human design or recognition.  Good examples of natural selection within human 
societies are, in Elster's view, scarce and for him this counts decisively against functional 
explanation. 
 
    Other authors have been more willing to accept natural selection within human societies, at 
least as one causal mechanism among others.  Evolutionary thought has been a feature of 
institutional economics in both its old and new guises (Nelson and Winter 1982; Hodgson 
1993; Andersen 1994; Vromen 1995).  Similar evolutionary ideas can be found outside 
economics, for example, in the sociologically based literature on organisational ecology 
(Hannan and Freeman 1977, 1989).  Economic and social theorists may disagree about the 
details of economic evolution, but they are prepared to contemplate natural selection as a 
feedback loop.  This improves the prospects for functionalism defined on Elster's highly 
restrictive criteria.  The prospects are further improved if one relaxes his requirement to ban 
human consciousness from functional explanation.  Consciousness may be pivotal to 
feedback loops and should not be dismissed out of hand.  One possible feedback loop, falling 
between full-blown intentionality and complete ignorance, is that people are initially unaware 
of the desirable consequences of their actions but later recognise them.  Learning from 
experience allows people to reproduce a valuable social institution even though it was never 
planned and may not be fully understood.  Actual feedback mechanisms may intermingle 
design, learning and natural selection: Stinchcombe (1968) sets out six varieties of feedback 
loop, any of which could underpin functional theories.  Forcing functional explanation to rely 
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solely on natural selection imposes a harsh restriction on functionalism and on social theory at 
large. 
 
    Critics have also rebuked functionalist sociology for its conservatism and complacency 
(Gouldner 1970).  Structural-functionalism had depicted society as a static, self-perpetuating 
system, built up from tightly interwoven institutions, to which most if not all members of 
society were well adjusted.  Existing inequalities of income, wealth and power could readily 
be interpreted as functional and therefore vital for the continued smooth running of society.  
The systemic vision highlighted neither the need for social change nor the means of achieving 
change and seemed incapable of modelling social conflict.  The purpose of functionalism 
appeared ideological, to provide an academically respectable case for the status quo.  Such 
criticisms pertain chiefly to the functional analysis of whole societies, on Parsonian lines.  
They are less applicable to those functionalist writers, following Merton, who have taken 
smaller groups as their social units and acknowledged social conflict and change.  Instead of 
furthering the general interest, institutions may be furthering the interests of a particular group 
or class at other groups' expense.  The clash of interests creates tensions and pressures for 
change, but the dominant groups may be able to impede major reforms and preserve their 
advantages.  Although much functionalist sociology of the 1950s and 1960s may have been 
tinged with complacency, this was a feature only of specific functional theories, not of 
functional methods as a whole. 
 
    Most of the arguments over functional methods in social science have been conducted 
within the sociological literature.  Economists have largely shunned functional ideas and, 
conforming to strict disciplinary boundaries, kept out of the sociological debates.  Their 
silence might suggest aloofness towards functional arguments, yet economists have been 
surprisingly willing to adopt them, albeit implicitly. 
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4.  Functional arguments in economic theory 
 
Neoclassical economists have customarily been hostile to the functional methods in 
sociology, above all to structural-functionalism, which clashes with neoclassical 
individualism.  The hostility has not stopped economists from using functional arguments, 
however, and implicit functionalism is commonplace in neoclassical theory.  Welfare 
economics provides the clearest examples, as the normative judgements it attaches to 
economic arrangements come close to ascribing functions.  Economic exchange among 
rational individuals has the function of realising potential gains from trade and, in doing so, 
promoting the welfare of the parties involved.  Exchange through markets is represented as 
having desirable consequences that must come about wherever voluntary trading occurs 
between rational people.  There are no collective or social benefits as such, but the mutual 
individual gains produce a generalised personal benefit spread among all traders.  When 
translated into aggregate, general-equilibrium terms, the desirability of exchange appears as 
the Pareto-efficiency properties of perfect competition, set out formally as the fundamental 
theorems of welfare economics.  This is akin to an individualistic functional analysis, 
whereby the general equilibrium system performs a useful function ± the attainment of Pareto 
efficiency ± described in individualistic language.  The analysis does not necessarily amount 
to a functional explanation of the prevalence of markets, but it is only a short step further to 
explaining actual markets through their desirable efficiency properties.  The notion of the 
invisible hand, at the core of so much economic theory, is essentially a case of functional 
reasoning. 
  
    Invisible-hand models exist in two main versions, one taking a bottom-up perspective 
starting with individual behaviour, the other taking a top-down perspective starting with 
desirable social consequences: Ullmann-Margalit (1978) terms these the standard and 
functional/evolutionary versions.  The standard version works upwards from rational 
individual behaviour to an unintended aggregate outcome and dwells on how social 
institutions are linked to prior individual motives.  There may be no reference to functions 
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here, but if the aggregate outcome is desirable and fulfils useful social functions (as in the 
neoclassical image of markets), then the argument takes on a functional hue.  The 
functional/evolutionary version of the invisible hand works in the opposite direction, 
beginning at the top with the desirable consequences of social behaviour.  When the 
identification of desirable consequences (functions) is viewed as explanatory, this fits the 
traditional mould of a functional method.  Unlike the standard version, the feedback 
mechanism linking social institutions and individual behaviour initially goes unspecified and 
could take alternative forms, including natural selection, learning and design.  Both versions 
of the invisible hand, especially the functional/evolutionary version, are near to functional 
analysis.  The functional aspect often remains implicit, and many economists would disown 
it, yet it lurks in the background of economic theorising. 
 
    Functional arguments become more obvious when neoclassical theory moves beyond 
perfect competition and addresses the emergence of institutions.  The new institutional 
economics, in some of its guises, tries to put institutional economics on the same theoretical 
footing as the neoclassical mainstream; it explains institutions through the interactions of 
rational individuals in market-like situations to produce socially desirable outcomes.  The 
analysis has a distinctly functional character.  In the property rights school, for instance, the 
function of property rights is to encourage the internalising of externalities (Demsetz 1967; 
Alchian and Demsetz 1972).  Well-defined property rights will supposedly emerge when the 
gains from internalising externalities outweigh the costs, yielding a net social benefit.  Social 
arrangements can then be explained by their desirable consequences, although the feedback 
loop relating the social consequences to individual behaviour is unspecified. 
 
    Much the same applies to attempts within the new institutional economics to explain the 
growth of particular organisations.  In the transaction-cost approach, the institutions that 
emerge depend on the transaction costs associated with markets: if these costs are high 
enough, non-market organisations will prove superior (Williamson 1975, 1985).  Social 
institutions are assumed to be well matched with their environment and hence socially 
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optimal.  Again the feedback loop is none too clearly specified; for Williamson it may include 
purposeful behaviour and learning, as well as natural selection.  This is common throughout 
the new institutional economics, which often draws on learning processes as feedback loops 
(Vromen 1995, Part II).  The theory does not insist on all functions being unintended, but the 
drift of the argument is unmistakably functional.    When Williamson (1988) discusses 
functionalism, he recognises the functionalist character of his work and leaves open the 
possibility of functions becoming manifest by adaptive learning.  Likewise, the evolutionary 
modelling of Nelson and Winter (1982) embodies adaptive learning alongside natural 
selection as the main evolutionary mechanism.  Functionalist logic permeates the new 
institutional economics (sometimes explicitly so), coupled with a neoclassical strand that 
adheres to reductive, individualistic objectives. 
 
    The old institutional economics, by contrast with the new, has been less keen on 
individualism and more willing to pursue methods resembling structural-functionalist 
sociology.  Old institutionalism appeals to habitual or normalised behaviour in place of 
instrumental rationality, and in this respect comes closer to the structural quality of sociology 
than to the individualism of neoclassical economics.  The functional aspect is usually implicit 
but still readily apparent: institutions are portrayed as having a function that accounts for their 
persistence.  Feedback loops differ among institutionalist authors and are not always fully 
specified. 
 
    One can distinguish between the approaches of Veblen and Commons in relating individual 
behaviour to social outcomes (Rutherford 1994, Chapter 5).  Veblen's approach is more 
evolutionary, based on the emergence of social rules and conventions fulfilling unintended 
functions.  The feedback loop, not wholly clear, seems to combine natural selection and 
learning.  This could fall short of functional explanation in the narrow sense, which permits 
only natural selection as a feedback loop, but the argument has strong functional traits.  
Veblen does, however, leave scope for conscious decision making and refers repeatedly to 
purposeful human action; he should not be interpreted as advocating crude functional 
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determinism (Hodgson 1992).  Later institutionalists, such as Ayres, shifted further towards 
socially conditioned behaviour and produced theory that mimicked functionalist sociology, 
but Veblen himself avoided structural reductionism.  Nor did he believe that all institutions 
promote the general social good: a major theme of his work is that normalised, habitual 
behaviour may promote sectional interests. 
 
    Commons opted for conscious decision making as the crucial feedback loop.  His work 
hinges on the legislative means by which property rights and other economic institutions are 
established.  He stands further away than Veblen from functional explanation in the narrow 
sense, since he sees the formal legal system as the intended product of human agents.  But he 
too leaves leeway for more than one feedback loop and does not exclude the idea that social 
customs and practices may spread through spontaneous, invisible-hand processes.  Like 
Veblen, he follows a functional argument by relating institutions to the functions they 
perform.  The theories of Veblen and Commons are by no means inconsistent, and the old 
institutionalism can embrace a variety of feedback loops.  It is not rigorously functional, but 
often functional in spirit. 
 
    Similar implicit functional methods exist in other branches of heterodox economics.  
Perhaps the most striking examples occur within Marxian economics, which has vehemently 
opposed both structural-functionalist sociology and neoclassical economics.  Marxian writers 
might have been expected to steer clear of functionalism, yet their work has typically taken a 
functional form.  This stems from the argument that ideology and social institutions will, for 
all modes of production, favour the dominant economic class.  Social arrangements are 
explained by showing that they have desirable consequences for the capitalist class, a 
functional argument with economic classes as the social units.  Elster (1982) criticises such 
Marxian arguments, calling for a feedback loop linking social outcomes with individual 
behaviour.  He denies natural selection in human societies and endorses a 'rational-choice 
Marxism' that places purposeful individual behaviour at the hub of social theory.  Responding 
to Elster, Cohen (1982) takes a more eclectic outlook.  He admits the functional character of 
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Marxian reasoning and the shortfalls of theories without proper causal relations but prefers to 
go for different, more sophisticated theorising, not to jump as Elster does all the way to 
methodological individualism.  It would be better if Marxians and other heterodox economists 
affirmed their functional arguments, refused to commit themselves to rational-choice 
methods, and took a more open, dispassionate view of what the actual feedback loops might 
be. 
 
    The implicit functionalism in both neoclassical and non-neoclassical economics illustrates 
the pervasiveness of functional explanation.  When hoping to explain economic or social 
institutions, theorists frequently assign them functions and theorise in a functional manner.  
Whether this counts as functional explanation depends on how one defines it and on the 
nature of the feedback loops.  But the tenor of much explanatory theory in the social sciences, 
including economics, has been functional.  The case for explicit functional methods and the 
role that they might play in explanatory theories are worth examining at greater length. 
 
 
 
5.  A qualified defence of functional methods  
 
Criticism of functional methods in social science has emphasised three supposed weaknesses: 
their shallowness and inability to provide causal explanations, their tendency towards holism 
and the denial of human agency, and their conservatism towards prevailing social 
arrangements.  The present qualified defence of functional methods argues that, while they do 
have drawbacks and limitations, they do not have these three weaknesses.  Employed 
carefully, functional methods can be consistent with causal explanation, can give due weight 
to human agency, and are capable of finding fault with the current social order. 
 
    Consider first the criticism that functional explanations can never be true explanations 
because they do not expose the true causality behind economic and social activities.  Such 
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criticism is well founded, in so far that explanatory theory aims to reveal causality, but it 
takes what might be regarded as a purist line.  Few theories, if any, can plausibly claim to 
have laid bare the full causality behind social behaviour, regardless of whether or not they are 
searching for it.  Functional methods are guilty not so much of failing to find causal relations 
as of omitting to declare the search for causality as a prime objective.  This may be an error, 
but it is not serious enough to discredit all functional approaches.  The descriptiveness of 
functional approaches, with their reliance on surface phenomena, is at least consistent with 
the limited claims made about causality.  A danger of purportedly causal explanations is that 
they too will lack depth and thus interpret empirical regularities as proof of causality, as in the 
Humean account of causality underlying positivism.  Mainstream economics has relied 
heavily on this shallow, empirically rooted view of causal explanation and in doing so has 
neglected alternative, deeper forms of causality (Lawson 1997).  Functional arguments may 
themselves be shallow and empirically based, but they hold back from equating empirical 
correlations with causal processes. 
 
    Functional reasoning can encourage a more pluralistic attitude to causality.  Reticence in 
specifying causal processes may sometimes be wise, when one remembers the complexity and 
diversity of economic behaviour.  If one is doubtful about the full causality driving events but 
still feels able to give a partial account of how an economic or social system operates, then the 
resulting theory is likely to have a functional cast, whether or not one presents it as being 
explicitly functional.  Functional methods may well appear accidentally as theorists strive to 
find partial explanations of particular facets of economic behaviour.  Theories that claim to go 
further and provide complete causal explanations will frequently pick out one feedback loop 
(natural selection, learning, purposeful action, etc.) at the expense of others.  This is apt to 
produce oversimplified, reductive theory, where the causal influences come uniquely from a 
single source.  Even if the theory aims to be non-reductive, there may still be a thinning out of 
the causal relations, offering only a blinkered view of causality.  The desire to discover 
fundamental causal processes, while admirable in itself, could induce theorists to seize 
prematurely on certain processes and obscure others perhaps equally important.  A quest for a 
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single overriding causal mechanism upon which theorists can found their models will 
promote rigid, mechanical social theory.  To avoid this, a modest functional approach 
allowing for plurality and indeterminacy of causal relations may be the more fertile method.  
Causal explanation could be the ultimate goal, but functional methods could provide a 
stepping stone on the way to later causal accounts. 
 
    The second major criticism of functional approaches concerns their alleged bias towards 
holistic, structural theory and neglect of human agency.  Functional arguments are far more 
pliable on the question of structure and agency than their critics have claimed.  The definition 
of functional explanation leaves open how a social function is fulfilled and never mentions 
structured behaviour or insists that individual desires must be subordinated to the social 
interest.  Critics of functionalism interpret such openness negatively, as an illegitimate, 
objective teleology that ascribes functions or purposes to inanimate, disembodied social 
institutions.  There are cases where functional reasoning does imply objective teleology (for 
example, the later forms of Parsonian structural-functionalism), but its basic nature does not 
enforce this.  In essence, functional explanation is silent about how agency and structure are 
related and can accommodate various interactions between them.  Though the silence might 
be seen as a problem, it nevertheless gives a flexible framework for handling 
agency/structure, micro/macro and individual/society issues. 
 
    The openness of functional methods is consistent with recent social theory, which has 
queried the customary opposition of agency and structure, arguing that they are intertwined.  
Giddens, for example, builds his social theory around the 'duality of structure', whereby 
agency and structure are conceptually distinct but thoroughly interdependent and inseparable 
(Giddens 1979, 1984).  Other theorists have expressed similar ideas in different conceptual 
language (Bourdieu 1977; Elias 1991).  Giddens's critics, who feel that he has gone too far in 
playing down social structure, mostly concur that structure should interact with agency 
(Callinicos 1985; Layder 1987; Archer 1982).  The drift of recent social theory has been 
towards breaking down the barriers between agency and structure (without fusing them into a 
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reductive unity) and exploring their interdependence.  These ideas pertain to all social 
behaviour and bear on economics no less than on the other social sciences (Jackson 1999).  
Most social theorists now assume a closer relation between agency and structure than had 
hitherto been the case in social theory.  Functional reasoning, with its indeterminate causality, 
leaves ample room for a non-reductive, non-dichotomous approach to agency and structure.  
An example of this is the neofunctionalism championed by the minority of sociologists who 
have kept faith with functional ideas and sought to develop them in a less holistic fashion 
(Alexander 1985, 1998; Munch 1987).  The customary macro scale of functionalist social 
theory does not compel a structural bias: as Mouzelis (1995) points out, the scale of analysis 
can be distinguished from the agency-structure issue.  There may exist macro agents whose 
decisions have important consequences for the whole economy, along with microstructures 
whose influence is only at a local level.  Functional theories defined on a grand, macro scale 
need not imply the privileging of structure over agency.  If used carefully, functional methods 
can permit a flexible treatment of agency and structure. 
 
    Avoidance of reductionism does not mean that agency and structure must play equal, 
balanced roles in determining human behaviour, and it remains possible that at certain times 
and for certain people one may dominate the other.  Consider the experiences of people at the 
opposite ends of an organisational hierarchy.  Those at the top will generally be rule-makers 
who have a say in setting the organisation's goals and freedom to criticise and reformulate 
existing rules and procedures.  Their social position creates space for agency and loosens the 
grip of rules on their everyday activities.  Those at the bottom are generally rule-followers 
who have little or no say in setting the organisation's goals and are bound by existing rules 
and procedures.  Their behaviour at work will adhere to a structured, routinised pattern 
imposed from above.  The people at the top of the hierarchy seem to be free individual agents, 
untrammelled by structures, whereas the people at the bottom are closer to the structurally 
dominated view of behaviour commonly associated with functionalist social theory.  In 
neither case, however, should agency and structure be seen as separate and independent of 
each other.  The seemingly free rule-makers will have had their beliefs and capacities 
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moulded to some extent by their social context, and the structurally bound rule-followers will 
be exercising agency when conforming to and thereby replicating established practices.  
Interdependence of agency and structure can take many forms without necessarily yielding a 
visible balance or evenness between them.  But non-reductive approaches (including those 
couched in functional terms) will not attempt to reduce behaviour to agency or structure 
alone. 
 
    The shift towards non-reductive social theory makes it harder to uphold a strict separation 
of intended and unintended functions.  Intended functions apparently planned and 
implemented by human actors are not exempt from external influences on the attitudes and 
social standing of the people concerned.  In many cases the designers of an institution will not 
be the people who implement it, and the level of conscious understanding may be lower 
among those performing pre-existing roles and procedures.  A planned institution will be 
subject to external structural influences on the plan and characterised by passive 
rule-following behaviour in its implementation.  Conversely, unintended functions that have 
supposedly emerged without human recognition must still be enacted through human agency 
and are unlikely to remain wholly beyond the consciousness of the people involved.  To 
assume that a function can stay undetected may underestimate the capacity for learning 
among both its beneficiaries, who have a vested interest in its preservation, and those who 
lose out, who stand to gain from social change.  If functions can be identified by external 
academic observers, then they may well be perceived, at least in part, by those with a more 
immediate interest and involvement.  Most functions in practice will be neither fully designed 
nor completely unrecognised, but fall somewhere in between.  The interdependency of agency 
and structure will blur the distinction between intended and unintended functions within 
functional methods, and in this respect the narrow definition of functional explanation, which 
discounts intended functions, is out of tune with recent social theory.  Interpreted broadly, 
however, functional arguments are consonant with the non-reductive social theory espoused 
by their critics. 
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    Contrary to its reductive image, functionalist social theory has distinguished many 
analytical levels and the relationships among them.  Parsons divided social systems into four 
subsystems ± economic, political, social and cultural ± each of which contained further 
subsystems.  The stratified approach, creating subsystems of subsystems of subsystems, 
yielded a rich analytical framework far removed from what would normally be deemed 
oversimplified or reductive.  Functionalism has often been aligned with systems theory, 
which sets up a highly generalised, multilayered, non-reductive framework within which 
further theorising can take place.  Few economists have ever subscribed to systems theory, 
despite its potential to encompass economic matters and place them within their social and 
natural setting (Boulding 1985; Hodgson 1987).  When economists have dealt with classic 
systems issues ± the context of economic behaviour, endogeneity of preferences and 
technology, structural complexity and variety ± they have seldom drawn explicit comparisons 
with systems theory or with the associated functional arguments.  Greater acceptance of 
functional methods might help to revive the broad, interdisciplinary outlook characterised by 
the systems approach. 
 
    Similar views upholding a stratified conception of reality have been voiced by the realist 
research programme, which originated in the philosophy of science and has lately been 
extended from natural to social sciences (Bhaskar 1979; Outhwaite 1987; Sayer 1992).  
Realism presupposes a real object of enquiry for social-scientific activities; reality exists in its 
own right, independently of scientific study, but has a complex, stratified form that can 
accommodate the intricacies of social science.  As with Parsons's functionalism, the various 
analytical levels may possess properties emergent from the other levels but irreducible to 
them.  Realism differs from functional methods in rejecting shallow, empirically based 
functional explanations and aiming to reveal the deeper causality beneath observed events.  
Structural-functionalism, for all its stratified character, operated at the higher levels of social 
structure and did not investigate fully the relationships among levels ± it evolved, quite 
arbitrarily, into structural reductionism.  Realist approaches, if used with care, should be able 
to eschew reductionism of either structural or individualistic varieties.  As yet, realism has 
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made little headway in economics, except for the work of a few heterodox economists 
(Mäki 1989; Lawson 1994, 1997; Fleetwood 1999).  Conscious realism could clarify 
economic method and bring economics nearer to the non-reductive naturalism and 
materialism seen elsewhere in the natural and social sciences (Jackson 1995, 1996).  On its 
own, a functional approach does not amount to realism, but it can foster a style of layered 
theorising consistent with the realist perspective. 
 
    The third main criticism of functional methods ± that they are conservative and incapable 
of contemplating social conflict and change ± follows the previous two in underestimating the 
versatility of functional reasoning.  To ascribe functions when theorising about society need 
not be to support the status quo or deny the possibility of social progress.  The term 'function' 
is a neutral concept that carries no ethical guarantee of utility or social desirability 
(Merton 1968).  In common parlance, people frequently assume that anything with a function 
must have value, yet the fulfilment of a function cannot on its own provide a watertight case 
for the item in question.  Certain functions might be thought ethically undesirable, at least by 
some sections of the population, and it might be better if these functions were left unfulfilled.  
Whenever institutions serve the interests of particular social groups, there will be ethical 
doubts about the institutions concerned: one of their functions may be to preserve inequality 
and privilege.  Although functional theories have in the past portrayed social institutions as 
fulfilling valuable functions for the benefit of society as a whole, this is only one functional 
approach among other, less conservative possibilities.  Functional theories can promote 
conservative interests, but they can also depict current arrangements in a less flattering light.  
The political and ethical stance of a functional theory originates with the theorist and is not 
built into the nature of functional methods. 
 
    Tacit functional arguments have always been a keystone of critical thinking.  Much social 
criticism rests on the claim that institutional arrangements benefit some social groups at the 
expense of others; preserving inequality and exploitation becomes a function (intended or 
unintended) of social institutions.  If social theorists stay aloof from anything resembling 
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functionalism, then it becomes difficult for them to make this argument.  Arrangements that 
are not stable and replicated over time would be ephemeral and less worthy as an object of 
criticism.  The stress on the persistence of social institutions and on the systemic aspect of 
society in functional methods has great relevance for the analysis of entrenched social 
privilege.  Making critical class-based or group-based arguments, in the manner of Marxian 
and other radical theories, will generally require functional habits of thought.  While 
functional thinking is not necessarily radical, radical thinking has often been functional, and 
the attempt to banish all functional ideas would hamper social criticism. 
 
    The foregoing argument amounts to only a qualified defence of functional methods, on the 
grounds that they do not possess the major faults attributed to them by their critics.  Such a 
defence falls short of claiming that functional methods alone can ever be adequate for 
explanatory theorising.  Ideally, they should be integrated with a wider, realist perspective 
that aspires to provide full causal explanations founded on a non-mechanistic notion of 
causality.  The issues in day-to-day economic theorising are more pragmatic than this, 
however, and economists have nothing to gain by spurning functional ideas.  As a step on the 
way to causal explanations, functional logic may be fruitful; the vagueness about causality 
may be a strength if it can encourage subtler, more pluralistic theory and prevent premature 
commitment to oversimplified 'causal' relations.  Whether this should be described as 
functional explanation is perhaps debatable, for causal explanation is the ultimate aim.  But 
the argument here is simply that functional methods may have something to contribute within 
a larger scheme, not that they should supplant causal explanation. 
 
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
There are two main reasons why greater tolerance of functional methods in economics would 
be desirable.  The first is that functional ideas have always been a part of economic theorising, 
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whether or not the theorists were conscious of them.  Any attempt to debar them from 
economics would impose a constraint on the discipline that economists would be hard pressed 
to meet, since implicit functionalism keeps breaking out, even when theorists avoid functional 
language.  Rather than trying to eliminate functional ideas and then suffering the 
embarrassment of failing to do so, economists might be better advised to take a more tolerant 
view. 
 
    The second reason for tolerance is that functional methods have several attractive features 
of potential value to economics, such as a cautious and pluralistic attitude to causality, an 
awareness of stratification and emergence, and a compatibility with realist social science.  
Explanatory theory should aim for full-blooded causal explanation, but may still profitably 
adopt functional modes of argument, which then become the means to a higher end, not an 
end in themselves.  By bringing out the functional methods in economics and making them 
explicit, one can raise important questions, suppressed in the mainstream, about how an 
economic system operates, how it is reproduced, and how it relates to individual members of 
society. 
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